

~~Secret Security Information~~

Personnel !!

CONFIDENTIAL

25X1A

12 August 1952

SUBJECT: CIA Reserve Officers

TO : Mr. Walter Reid Wolf
Deputy Director, CIA
Washington, D. C.

References:

September 1949
August 1950

25X1A

Document No.	27
No Change in Class.	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> Reclassified	
Class. Changed To:	TS S ⁶
Auth:	14-11-78
Date:	By: 35

25X1A

1. As requested on the day of your departure from [REDACTED] we are again submitting our views on the establishment of a CIA Augmentation Group in [REDACTED] to serve as a mobilization unit under the authority of European Command, for all CIA personnel having reserve status.

2. We feel that this solution would assure in emergency conditions the continuity of service with the CIA [REDACTED] of our reservist personnel, and it would also protect the reserve status of individual employees.

3. Of the above, the preservation of continuity of service is by far the more important. As matters now stand, on the day of mobilization in Europe (which would most likely be the date of commencement of hostilities) we stand to lose the services of virtually all our senior male personnel. In case of an emergency all U. S. personnel in [REDACTED] would come under military control. But whereas military personnel presently assigned to the Agency in [REDACTED] as well as civilian personnel without reserve status, would remain [REDACTED] reserve personnel would have to report to their mobilization units. As a result, our operations will be crippled at the most critical juncture of military and political developments, in fact at the very time when our intelligence gathering effort should be operating at maximum effectiveness.

4. Our detailed study of this problem and a long series of discussions with EUCOM revealed that there are no means of securing the continuity of our operations under emergency conditions except the establishment of an M-Day [REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

~~Secret Security Information~~

~~Secret - Security Information~~

-2-

5. The fact that our civilian organization must be kept intact after the outbreak of hostilities is appreciated as an essential minimum requirement of any CIA war planning. [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1A

[REDACTED], it is not enough to have the Department of Defense agree to make all reserve and non-reserve personnel under my jurisdiction immune to mobilization in the Theater for a sufficient time to make the peace-war transition. Such transition [REDACTED] may take a matter of minutes. The confusion which will exist here at the outbreak of hostilities requires the utmost simplicity in administrative procedures. The control of our personnel must be planned in advance. The necessary organizational structure should be developed now to fit in with Theater requirements.

25X1A

25X1A

[REDACTED]

Follow through on our commitments in the early days of hostilities. The position reportedly taken by the Department of Defense (that no M-day slots are available to CIA) is hard to understand. It would seem to me to be of critical interest to the Defense Department that CIA be equipped during wartime with military personnel trained in CIA techniques who can perform CIA work in close cooperation with the services. There are two ways of accomplishing this:

A. Insure that all reserve personnel in CIA will be assigned to CIA in wartime; and

B. Train CIA personnel within the framework of the reserve program.

7. Our proposed Table of Distribution includes Army, Air, Navy, and Marine elements and will contain adequately high grades to enable distribution according to the job to be done. I recognize the problem of equalization of grades (i.e., there may be a discrepancy between a man's current responsibility and the service grade he held seven years ago) but this problem is secondary compared to the essential one of holding our organization together. I recall that there was little difference between the Army and OSS with regard to disparative grades during the war, and I am advised that the main reason why OSS failed to make better progress in straightening out the situation was that they superimposed their own red tape and poor administration on top of the Army's and as a result they were hardly able to do anything.

8. There has been some mention of the possibility that CIA personnel would be prohibited from engaging in reserve activities. Since I cannot

~~Secret - Security Information~~

~~Secret - Security Information~~

-3-

believe that such an arbitrary, and possibly illegal, course of action is seriously contemplated, I will not present my arguments against it at this time.

9. In conclusion, the problem of our reservists has been with us for over three years. During this time absolutely nothing has been accomplished to arrive at a solution. [REDACTED]
we consider this problem as particularly urgent and have submitted a proposal which would take care of all our personnel [REDACTED] and if you so desire,

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

~~Secret - Security Information~~